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III. Argument 
A. Evidence of Mr. Martinez' Prior Conviction of Assault Was Not Properly 
Admitted Pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1). 
Contrary to what the State now asserts, Mr. Martinez' prior conviction was not properly 
admitted under Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1). As an initially matter, the State has wholly 
failed to establish that the trial court even considered Rule 609 or balanced the relevant factors in 
reaching its decision to erroneously admit the evidence of the prior conviction. A fact which, in 
and of itself, constitutes error. Moreover, even if the trial court had properly considered Rule 
609 it committed error by not excluding the conviction evidence. 
It is beyond dispute that the State failed in its burden to establish that the trial court relied 
on Rule 609 to admit Mr. Martinez prior conviction. See, State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,1334 
(Utah 1986) (the State bears the burden to show that the 609 evidence is properly before the 
court). This court addresses the effect of such a failure in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah 
App. 1988). In that the case, the court stated, 
in United States v. Hendershot 614 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1980), as in this case, there 
was no evidence that the court required a balancing of interests. Rather,' [t]he trial 
court gave no indication of what standard it was employing; it merely ruled that the 
prior conviction would be admissible." Id at 652. The Ninth Circuit found error, 
'because of the possibility that the trial court applied [an] improper legal standard...." 
Id. at 653. We, similarly, cannot ascertain from the record before us whether a proper 
balancing process occurred, and, indeed, it appears that the court did not consider 
admissibility under 609(a)(1), and therefore, did not balance the competing 
considerations. Therefore, because the trial court did not utilize the Banner criteria 
and the balancing of probative value versus prejudicial effect, we find that the court 
erred in finding the prior conviction admissible. 
State v. Wight. 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988). The record in this case is equally lacking with 
respect to whether the trial court employed the proper Rule 609 analysis and a similar result, a 
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follow. 
In the event the court does not find error in the trial court's failure to conduct the Banner 
analysis Mr. Martinez prior conviction was nonetheless improperly admitted. The State correctly 
notes that Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) permits the admission of certain prior felony 
convictions for the purposes of challenging the credibility of the accused. Specifically, the Rule 
provides, in pertinent part, "evidence that an accused has been convicted of [a crime punishable 
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year] shall be admitted if the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused." In 
clarifying what types of convictions may be admitted under this Rule, the Utah Supreme Court 
identified five factors which the trial court must consider. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d, at 1334 
(Utah 1986). Those factors include: 1) the nature of the crime, as bearing on the character for 
veracity of the witness; 2) the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction; 3) the similarity 
of the prior crime to the charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to 
punish the accused as a bad person; 4) the importance of credibility issues in determining the 
truth in a prosecution tried without decisive nontestimonial evidence; and 5) the importance of 
the accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions probative of the 
accused's character of veracity. Id 
With little or no analysis the State suggests, "the greater weight of the factors fall in favor 
of the probative value of defendant's prior convictions" arguing that only one of the five factors 
favors exclusion. Br. of Appellee, at fn. 5. However, a more careful examination of the five 
factors in light of the facts and circumstance of this case shows that in fact all five factors require 
exclusion of the prior conviction. 
• 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The first Banner factor requires the trial court to examine the nature of the crime as it 
bears on credibility of the witness. Banner, at 1334. As a general matter, crimes of violence do 
not bear on the defendant's veracity as a witness. In Banner, for example, the defendant was 
charged and convicted with committing sodomy upon a child and sexual abuse of a child. Before 
the trial began, the defendant moved in limine to exclude evidence of two prior convictions of 
assault with the intent to commit rape. The trial court denied the motion. On review, the Court 
held the declination an abused of discretion noting, "The crime of assault with intent to commit 
rape does not inherently reflect on defendant's character for truth and veracity. Instead, it sheds 
about the same light as any felony involving moral turpitude." Id. 
The reasoning found in Banner applies with equal force in this case. Here, the crime of 
assault by a prisoner, much like the crime of assault with intent to commit rape, does not reflect 
on Mr. Martinez' character for truthfulness. Rather, as evidenced by the prosecutor's closing 
argument, the value of admitting the prior conviction is to show that Mr. Martinez' is 
predisposed to commit crimes of violence. Given that the crime of assault does not speak to 
issues of credibility, the first Banner factor favors exclusion of the prior conviction. 
The State concedes that the similarities between the crimes favors exclusion. Again, both 
crimes involved assault by a prisoner. Indeed, the prosecutor highlighted that fact during his 
cross examination of Mr. Martinez during the following exchanges: 
Q. So, you're in jail for a conviction of a crime of assault by a prisoner, are you not? 
A. Yes. lam. 
Q. So, you beat someone up, in a correctional facility; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
3 
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R. 159, at 176. 
Q You're just an innocent victim? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. An innocent victim with a prior felony conviction for assault by a prisoner; is that 
right? 
A. Yes. 
R. 159, at 179. 
The State also concedes that Mr. Martinez' credibility as a witness was important to his 
defense.1 That fact bears on both the fourth and fifth Banner factors which are the importance of 
the defendant's testimony in the absence of any physical evidence offered in support of the 
State's case. In essence, the only evidence Mr. Martinez had to support his defense was his own 
testimony.2 Similarly, the only decisive evidence offered against Mr. Martinez was the testimony 
of the victim. As such, Mr. Martinez credibility as a witness was critical to his defense thus 
cutting in favor of exclusion. 
Finally, the State implies Rule 609 favors admission of the prior conviction because the 
two nearly identical crimes were committed within a relatively short time frame. However, the 
more reasoned approach suggests that fact favors exclusions rather than admission. Mr. Martinez 
1
 "Third, the defendant's credibility was important to determine which party was telling 
the truth." Br. of Appellee, at fn. 5. 
2
 As the State points out, Mr. Toledo, who was called as a defense witness, "was 
unconvincing. Toledo was shown to have lied about a prior conviction, he also admitted to being 
defendant's friend, and he frequently gave conflicting testimony concerning his view of the 
event. Based upon Toledo's own admissions, and given the size of the window through which he 
supposedly viewed the fight, it is doubtful that Toledo even witnessed the scuffle. Br. of 
Appellee, at 19 (citations omitted). 
4 
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is charged in the instant offense with committing the alleged assault on June 10,1999. R. 4-5; 
159, at 76-85. The prior conviction was also committed in 1999. R. 161, 3. Therefore, at best 
only six months separate the two offenses. The prejudicial inference which is drawn from the 
close proximity of the two events is that Mr. Martinez is, as evidenced by the recent prior 
conviction, predisposed to getting into fights. Indeed, the admission of that conviction moves 
Mr. Martinez from the status of one who may have run into some trouble in this life, to one who 
is presently violent and confrontational. That type of evidence does not go to credibility but 
rather to the unfavorable and impermissible suggestion that Mr. Martinez is predisposed to 
commit crimes of violence. That being the case, the closeness in proximity of the two crimes 
warrants exclusion. 
In sum, all of the Banner factors favor exclusion. That fact, coupled with the fact that the 
trial court did not employ the proper 609 analysis requires the court to concluded that the trial 
court erred in allowing the prior conviction into evidence. 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Gross Misconduct by Arguing That Mr. Martinez Was 
Predisposed To Commit Assault. 
The fact that the prosecutor argued Mr. Martinez' prior conviction suggest that he was 
"predisposed to commit these crimes" is patent prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal. A 
prosecutor commits misconduct in closing argument when his remarks Mcall[] to the jurors' 
attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict." State v. 
Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982); see also State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 
1992). Indeed, "a prosecutor may never argue or suggest to the finder of fact, either directly or 
indirectly, that a defendant should be convicted because of his criminal character or that he was 
5 
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guilty of the crime charged because he acted in accord with a criminal propensity shown by such 
evidence A prosecutor who intentionally calls to jurors' attention matters that they should not 
consider in reaching a verdict is clearly guilty of misconduct, particularly when a prosecutor 
argues prior bad acts or prior criminal conduct as a basis for convicting." State v. Saunders, 992 
P.2d 951, (Utah 1999)(citing State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 1992); State v. 
larafa, 720 P.2d 1368,1372-73 (Utah 1986). It is undisputed that the prosecutor comments that 
Mr. Martinez was "predisposed to commit crimes like these" constitutes misconduct. Indeed, the 
States concedes as much with its silence on this point. 
In this case both the admission of the prior conviction as well as the prosecutor's blatant 
misconduct constitutes error. 
C. The Admission of The Prior Conviction And The Prosecutor's Patent Misconduct 
Are Sufficient To Undermine The Confidence In The Verdict. 
Having established error with respect to the admission of the prior conviction and the 
prosecutorial misconduct the court must determine whether the errors were harmless. See, State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)(concerning prior convictions); State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116,122 (Utah 1989)(concerning prior convictions); State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032,1038 
(Utah 1987)(concerning prior convictions); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah 1986) 
(concerning prior convictions); State v. Reed, 8 P. 3d 1025 (Utah 2000)(concerning prosecutorial 
misconduct); State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997)(concerning prosecutorial 
misconduct); State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah 1998)(concerning prosecutorial 
misconduct). The test for harmless error in both instances is whether, absent the error, there was 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant. Id The facts and circumstances 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in this case establish that the claimed errors were not harmless. 
The unfair prejudice visited on Mr. Martinez through the admission of the prior 
conviction and the prosecutor's impermissible comments that is that those errors effectively 
denied Mr. Martinez any defense and further cast him in a light which was entirely unrelated to 
the instant offense. The State suggests that this case came down to the testimony of Terry, 
Mattingly, Toledo and Mr. Martinez. Br. of Appellee, at 19. However, Mattingly did not 
witness the occurrence. R. 159, at 153. Furthermore, according to the State, Toledo was not a 
credible witness. Br. of Appellee, at 19. Therefore, what this case truly came down to was the 
testimony of Mr. Martinez and Mr. Terry. Thus, if Mr. Martinez' character is impeached based 
on an erroneously admitted prior conviction compounded by the argument that he is predisposed 
to commit assault, Mr. Martinez has no defense. 
Furthermore, the admission of the prior conviction drastically altered the light in which 
Mr. Martinez could be presented. Absent the prior conviction Mr. Martinez could have been 
presented as a meek and minor 130 pound 17 year old child who made one stupid mistake in the 
past; a mistake which has cost him his freedom and now subjected him to physical abuse by a 
rule obsessed guard. However, with the evidence of the prior crime the dynamics of the evidence 
change substantially. Now, the jury has before it evidence that Mr. Martinez has a violent 
disposition with no concern for committing multiple assault on whomever may be present. This, 
coupled with the State's argument that Mr. Martinez is predisposed to commit assault, was 
sufficient to undermine the confidence in the jury's verdict thus requiring reversal. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully request the Court reverse the judgment 
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below and remand this case for further proceedings. 
R. Montgomery 
Attorney for Appellant 
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